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Electricity for all at affordable costs has been a global 
aspiration since the beginning of the twentieth century. 
With the discovery of nuclear fission and the demonstration 
of nuclear electricity, this aspiration appeared quite close to 
realization. Unfortunately, over the decades, we could only 
see a constantly receding goal post.  Not only were there 
no major breakthroughs in the nuclear reactor technologies 
bringing the costs down, but the industry had also to bear 
the increasing costs associated with nuclear safety and 
security. It is not surprising that today, a good fraction of 
the population actually believes that the nuclear option is 
no longer a relevant option to address the electricity needs 
of the global population. At the same, it has to be recognized 
that there is a mismatch between projected global energy 
demands and sustainable global energy resources.
The authors, Prof. B. V. Sreekantan and Prof. B. N. Karkera, 
have been arguing that with innovative siting of the nuclear 
power plants underground close to large reservoirs at the 
top of the hills, it is possible not only to bring the costs down 
but also increase the safety and security of the plants. The 
idea was discussed in a workshop in National Institute of 
Advanced Studies, Bangalore.  The present monograph is 
an attempt to formally capture the ideas in print and place 
them before a larger audience for evaluation.
V S Ramamurthy
Director
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While India, after independence has made tremendous 
progress in several areas of technology such as – atomic 
energy, space, electronics, information, communications 
and so on, it is a woeful fact that in terms of providing basic 
necessities of life like food, water, health facilities, education 
and electrical power it is still reeling at atrocious levels. 
It is a regrettable fact that nearly 40% of the population 
is still below the poverty level. There is no electricity for 
a large fraction of the villages. Even in most of the cities 
nearly 20% of the population is without electricity. The 
governmental agencies are fully aware of this situation 
and ambitious plans  have been drawn up to remedy this 
situation. Strategies for long term energy security are 
shown in Figure 1 [1]. At the present time (2012), thermal 
and hydroelectric sources dominate the power scenario. 
While nuclear power is less than 3% (4.78 GWe) today, it is 
hoped that it will reach about 25% (275 GWe) by 2050 using 
only the indigenous Uranium. This share will be doubled 
to about 50% (600 GWe) by strategically importing during 
the intervening period 2012-2020, 40 GWe LWRs along 
with requisite  uranium fuel.
These projections are discussed in “Strategy for Growth 
of Electrical Energy in India Document 10, August 2004, 
DAE” [1], and also in the article by Dr. Srikumar Banerjee, 
Former Chairman of DAE [2]. There is also an excellent 
review article by Prof. Sukhatme, Former Chairman, Atomic 
Energy Regulatory Board [3], in which the author has 
discussed the relative merits and demerits of the energy 
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options before us. There are many who are optimistic 
about breakthroughs in Solar Energy. Prof. B.N. Karkera 
himself is promoting 90% efficient ‘Solar Bio Electricity’ for 
domestic lighting by peddling dynamo for health, free of 
tariff and with  nominal investment by Electricity Boards 
for the benefit of remote isolated population for whom it 
has been impractical to reach electrical supply for decades 
and for the benefit of poor labour class by diverting the 
saved electricity to small scale industry. 
Figure 1. Strategies for Long-Term Energy Security [1]
At the present time, in India, the installed capacity of 
Nuclear Power is only 4.78 Gigawatt Electrical (Appendix 1, 
Table 1). The number of Nuclear Power reactors operating 
is twenty. Out of these, the first two reactors at Tarapur 
(TAPS-1 & TAPS-2) are the Boiling Water-Reactors using 
enriched Uranium and MOX fuel element and the rest 
are all Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) using 
Natural Uranium (U) (0.7% U235+99.3% U238) as the fuel 
element. (Further details are available in Appendix 1). 
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The current Indian three stage strategy for achieving 
large scale increase of Nuclear Power production is the same 
as the one spelled out by  Dr. Homi Bhabha, the founder 
of the Indian Atomic Energy programme in the 1950’s, 
as  depicted  in Figure 2 - “Three Stage Indian Nuclear 
Programme” and in Figure 3 - “Neutrons Produced per 
Fission in 235U, 233U and 239Pu”. This strategy is based on 
the following facts on India’s strengths and weaknesses:
Stage-1: India has limited Uranium  and is used in this 
stage, in which U235 generates fission power while a tiny 
fraction of the balance fertile U238 transmutes into a new 
fissile material Pu239. U235 is natural fissile material and the 
rest 99.3% is fertile material U238. India uses this naturally 
occurring nuclear fuel in Pressurised Heavy Reactors 
(PHWRs) for the best possible thermal neutron fission 
cross section economy. These are  Thermal Reactors  using 
Heavy Water (HW) as moderator to thermalise the fission 
neutrons and also  as coolant to transport the thermal 
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Figure 2. Three stage Indian Nuclear Programme [2]
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technology, India has mastered Stage-1 (Figure 2) by using 
its strengths well. The limited quantity of transmuted Pu239 
and large quantity of depleted U are essential for the next 
stage-2. Stage 1 will be wound up with exhaustion of the 
lean source of Uranium within the country.  
Stage-2: India  started building Fast Breeder Reactors 
(FBRs) using limited quantity of transmuted Pu239 for (i) 
highest yield of fission neutrons (Figure 3); (ii) fast neutron 
economy; (iii) consequential breeding of its own fuel Pu239 
from depleted U; and (iv) later breeding another fissile 
material U233 from fertile Th232; while generating fission 
power from fissile Pu239. It has to be pointed out that the 
breeder reactor technology requires the use of liquid 
sodium as the coolant, which is a highly sophisticated 
and difficult technology since handling liquid sodium is 
a very hazardous problem. This technology too has been 
mastered at the Kalpakam Reactor Laboratory in Chennai. 
FBRs use this liquid sodium technology to transport the 
thermal energy from the fuel elements, now mastered 
under Stage 2 (Figure 2). This stage will be wound-up 
eventually with the exhaustion of the supply of depleted U 
as a consequence of closing of Stage-1. The bred U233 is the 
fuel for the next Stage-3.
Figure 3.  Neutrons Produced per Fission in 235U, 233U and 
239Pu as a function of incident neutron energy [2]
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Stage-3: India has designed AHWR, a prototype of 
Stage-3 thermal breeder reactors (TBR). U233 is bred from 
fertile Th232, initially in FBR (Stage-2) and continued in 
TBR (Stage-3). This is Thermal Reactor using Heavy Water 
(HW) as moderator to thermalise the fission neutrons and 
as coolant to transport the thermal energy from the fuel 
elements. TBR is simpler and breed its own fuel U233.
These three stage strategies (Figure 2) are logical from 
various angles:
(i) Limited resources of U within the country.
(ii) Mastering ofTechnologies of HW and Liquid 
Sodium Handling ; 
(iii) Ensuring High Thermal Neutron Fission Cross 
Section
(iv) High Neutron yield per absorption/reproduction 
Factors  
(v) Civil Nuclear Deal.
(vi) Long term energy safety
Short time bottleneck from limited U in-house is being 
overcome by importing Light Water Reactors under Civil 
Nuclear Deal.
Interestingly, it is estimated that India has about 
225,000 tons of thorium metal and the above third stage 
technology can yield power to the extent of 1.3 Terawatt 
hours - enough to serve India for a long time. At IGCAR 
Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu, a Fast Breeder Test Reactor 
(FBTR) of 40 Megawatt (thermal) is operating since 1985. A 
500 Megawatt (electrical) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor 
is under construction with uranium-plutonium mixture 
which is expected to go into operation soon. Figure 1 is 
essentially based on the projections made by DAE on 
the basis of the above 3-stage scenario with PHWR’s and 
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Breeder Reactors becoming operational at the time scales 
shown. 
With all this optimistic and realistic projections and 
with all the necessary technologies in hand, there is no 
doubt a great future for the requisite electrical power 
realization through nuclear power generation in the coming 
decades, practically wiping out the power deficit by 2050. 
However, there is one dark cloud which has appeared in 
recent years, which, if not satisfactorily dispelled, may 
impede the progress of nuclear power generation, not only 
in our country, but also elsewhere in the world for the same 




nuClear Power reaCtor aCCidents –  
world over
Since the mid fifties of the last century, 382 nuclear 
power reactors have been operating around the globe 
producing 334.169 Giga Watts of electrical power (Appendix 
1, Table 4). Another 83 reactors are under construction which 
are expected to add additional 92 Gigawatts of electrical 
power. What certainly is commendable and creditable of 
the designers and operators of the power reactors, is the 
fact that, despite the large number of reactors operating 
for such long periods, (~15,000 reactor years) the number 
of major accidents are few. Nevertheless, some minor 
and major accidents have taken place which cannot be 
ignored. 
The Table 1, taken from the Wikipedia article on 
“Nuclear and Radiation Accidents” lists such 23 accidents 
– their location, date of accident, cause of accident, number 
of deaths, monetary loss (US$ 16 Billion) and also the 
level of accident as defined by IAEA. The details and the 
references are available in the Wikipedia [5] article.
It is to be noted from the table that in most of the 
accidents no deaths have occurred. We will consider, in 
some detail, the few serious cases which were at INES level 





Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents with multiple fatalities and/or 
more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011















Explosion at SL-1 
prototype at the National 
Reactor Testing Station. 
All 3 operators were 
killed when a control rod 










Partial core meltdown of 
the Fermi 1 Reactor at 
the Enrico Fermi Nuclear 
Generating Station. No 









On January 21, 1969, 
it suffered a loss-of-
coolant accident, 
leading to a partial 
core meltdown and 
massive radioactive 
contamination of the 









There was reportedly a 
partial nuclear meltdown 
in Leningrad nuclear 








Electrical error causes 
fire in the main trough 
that destroys control 




Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents with multiple fatalities and/or 
more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011















Malfunction during fuel 
replacement. Fuel rod 
ejected from reactor 














Severe corrosion of 
reactor and release of 
radioactivity into the 










Loss of coolant and 
partial core meltdown 
due to operator errors. 
There is a small release 
of radioactive gasses. 
See also Three Mile 











operator error, and 
design problems force 
a six year outage at 










startup, which led to 
suspension of operations 











emergency shutdown of 




Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents with multiple fatalities and/or 
more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011















explosion, fire, and 
meltdown, necessitating 
the evacuation of 
300,000 people from 
Kiev and dispersing 
radioactive material 
across Europe (see 
Chernobyl disaster 
effects)















300 reactor releases 
small amounts of fission 
products (0.1 GBq Co-









Peach Bottom units 2 













Niagara Mohawk Power 
Corporation to shut 









Inspections at Calvert 
Cliff Units 1 and 2 reveal 
cracks at pressurized 




Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents with multiple fatalities and/or 
more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011
















An accident at the 
Sosnovy Bor nuclear 
plant leaked radioactive 
gases and iodine into the 








Leaking valve forces 
shutdown Millstone 
Nuclear Power Plant 












B a l a n c e - o f - p l a n t 
equipment malfunction 
forces shutdown and 
extensive repairs at 









accident killed two 
workers, and exposed 
one more to radiation 










Severe corrosion of 
control rod forces 24-








Steam explosion at 
Mihama Nuclear Power 




Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents with multiple fatalities and/or 
more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011













A tsunami flooded and 
damaged the 5 active
 reactor plants. Loss of 
backup electrical power 
led to overheating, 
meltdowns, and 
evacuations.
[Worker dies at 
damaged Fukushima 
nuclear plant”. CBS 
News. 2011-05-14]
*[Martin Fackler (June 
1, 2011). “Report Finds 
Japan Underestimated 
Tsunami Danger”. New 
York Times]; #[ IAEA 
Briefing on Fukushima 
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Energy Accidents in the Last 100 Years
tHe tHree mile island aCCident (USA)
A nuclear accident of INES level 5, occurred at the 
Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, USA, on 28 March 
1979. Investigations revealed that the accident was due to 
operator error and failure of monitoring instrumentation. 
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A small valve in the plumbing system opened to relieve 
the pressure in the reactor but failed to close. This caused 
the cooling water to drain off which led to the overheating 
of the core. The monitoring instruments provided false 
information which made the plant operator shut down 
the emergency water supply that would have cooled the 
reactor. The core temperature rose to 4300oF. The plant 
designers who were contacted, stepped in at this stage and 
controlled further damage. There was a small release of 
radioactive gas. No one died. The estimated damage was 
2.4 billion dollars. It is suspected that one person, exposed 
to radiation might die of cancer.
tHe CHernobyl nuClear aCCident (ukrainian ssr) aPril 26, 
1986
Till the more recent Fukushima accident, the Chernobyl 
accident of INES level 7, was regarded as the worst accident 
in the history of nuclear power. Not all the details and the 
extent of damage are fully available yet.
What is known is summarized as follows in [6]:
“During a routine test, the plant’s safety systems were 
turned off to prevent any interruptions of power to the 
reactor. The reactor was supposed to be powered down to 
25 percent of its capacity, and this is when the problems 
began. The reactor’s power fell to less than one percent, 
and so the power had to be slowly increased to 25 percent. 
Just a few seconds after facility operators began the test, 
however, the power surged unexpectedly and the reactor’s 
emergency shutdown failed. What followed was a full-
blown nuclear meltdown. 
The reactor’s fuel elements ruptured and there was 
a violent explosion. The fuel rods melted after reaching a 
temperature over 3,600oF. The graphite covering the reactor 
then ignited and burned for over a week, spewing huge 
amounts of radiation into the environment. 
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About 200,000 people had to be permanently relocated 
after the disaster.  The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) reported in 2005 that 56 deaths could be 
linked directly to the accident. Forty-seven of those were 
plant workers and nine were children who died of thyroid 
cancer. The report went on to estimate that up to 4,000 
people might die from long-term diseases related to the 
accident. Those numbers are a subject of debate, however, 
as the Soviet Union did much to cover up the extent of 
the damage. The World Health Organization reported the 
actual number of deaths related to Chernobyl was about 
9,000.” 
fukusHima daiiCHi nuClear disaster (sCale 7)
The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster happened on 11 
March 2011 following a major earthquake that triggered 
a Tsunami in the Pacific Ocean. The nuclear power plant 
at Fukushima comprised of six Boiling Water reactors 
designed by General Electric and maintained by the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company. Out of them, reactors 1, 2 and 
3 were in operation, reactor 4 was undergoing periodic 
inspection and reactors 5 and 6 had been shut down for 
maintenance. Reactors 1, 2 and 3 suffered full melt down 
since the Tsunami had resulted in tripping the grid, 
flooding of emergency generators, and consequential 
failure of the coolant water circulation. Further, the efforts 
to use sea water to cool the reactors resulted in completely 
ruining the reactors. In the first instance, an evacuation of 
all people within a radius of 20 kms was effected.
According to Japanese Government estimates the 
amount of radioactivity released was one-tenth of what had 
been released during the Chernobyl accident. It is feared 
that significant amount of radioactivity has entered the 
ground as well as the sea. Radioactive Cesium which can 
cause cancer has been located upto distances of 30-50 kms, 
and sale of food grown in this area has been prohibited. 
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No immediate deaths, but six workers had been 
exposed to very high levels of radiation. Three hundred 
others also have been exposed but to a lower level of 
radiation. The estimate of those who may die of cancer 
ranges from 100 to 1000. 
An investigation commission was set up by the 
Japanese Government to determine the causes of the 
Fukushima Nuclear accident and make recommendations. 
The commission report is now available on the web [7]. 
According to the report of the commission while the 
earthquake of March 11 in the Pacific Ocean and the resulting 
Tsunami contributed to the disaster happening, these are 
secondary causes; the primary cause is “Human Error” and 
the failure of the back-up power system. The report is 
critical about the functioning of the Tokyo Electric Power 
Corporation and the concerned government bureaucracy. 
The message from the chairman of the commission Kiyoshi 
Kurokawa is a very frank appraisal of the whole incident 
from which valuable lessons can be learnt. This message is 
presented in the Appendix 4.
As has been pointed out by Prof. Atul H Choksi [4] 
it is really difficult to know the extent of damage that 
these nuclear accidents can cause in the long term. Prof. 
Choksi points out that, in the case of the Chernobyl 
accident different International organizations have given 
wide ranging estimates of likely cancer deaths that may 
occur over long periods of time. While the United Nations 
Scientists Committee on the Efforts of Atomic Radiations 
gives the number as 62, the UN Chernobyl Forum and 
WHO give the figure as 4000 and the committee of 52 
scientists commissioned  by Greenpeace  places the number 
of cancer deaths at 93,000 and the group of three scientists 
from Russia and Belarus give the number as 985,000. These 
wide disparities in the projected number of cancer deaths 
are essentially due to lack of agreement on the correlation 





underground siting of nuClear Power 
stations
From what has been presented in the previous 
chapters, it is clear that the future of Nuclear Power for 
electricity is at cross roads in all the countries in the world. 
On the one hand, it is abundantly clear that nuclear power 
is the best choice for enhancing the power needs of many 
countries, particularly in India which as we have seen is at 
a miserably low level to-day. The Fast Breeder Technology, 
in which considerable technological development has been 
made in India in addition to the standard technologies 
(PHWRs), has provided the scope for solving the power 
problem for hundreds of years. One does not have to wait 
for breakthroughs in solar power technologies or fusion 
power which may take a long time to be on production scale 
to become feasible. Neither can we count on the “Solar Bio 
Electricity” being promoted by Prof. B.N. Karkera, as it is 
for self powering of small pockets of population isolated 
from power grids and is unfit for industrial usage. While 
the entire nuclear scenario looks so optimistic, the recent 
Fukushima accident in Japan has made it necessary to 
rethink on the large scale expansion of nuclear power. One 
is forced to proceed with caution since radioactive spill out 
from explosion of nuclear reactors can cause serious damage 
to civilian population in terms of health, food, water and 
can take a long time to remedy the ill effects. Taking serious 
cognizance of this aspect, several advanced countries like 
Germany have closed down their nuclear reactors while 
some other countries have decided not to go ahead with the 
construction of further nuclear power stations. These are 
countries that have adequate access to alternative sources of 
power like thermal or hydel and also do not have such dire 
and urgent necessity of additional power like India.
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In this context, the question arises whether there is 
any alternative by which one can have nuclear power, and 
also ensure mitigation of the dangers of radioactivity to a 
large extent, if not complete elimination. 
Immediately after the Fukushima accident last year in 
March 2011, one of the authors of this book (BVS), based on 
his forty years of experience (1951-1991) of operating large 
scale experiments on cosmic rays underground up to depths 
of 8000 ft below ground level in the 10,000 ft deep Kolar 
Gold Fields in India, and also because of his familiarity 
with various neutrino underground observatories in Japan 
(Kamiokande, and Super-Kamiokande), Italy-Switzerland 
(Mont Blanc), USA (Home Stake Salt Mine), and  Canada 
(Sudbury) which are operating very large scale installations, 
and the Large Hadron Collider operating under 300 to 500 
ft  rock depending on the over head terrain in the Alps, 
realized that there should be no technical difficulties in 
installing and operating nuclear reactors underground, 
which will certainly minimize to a large extent the damage 
that can be caused by a core meltdown and consequent 
explosion of the nuclear reactors. In case of such a mishap, 
the entire spilled radioactivity will be contained within the 
ground and could be vitrified. 
While discussing this possibility with the other author 
(BNK) who is a reactor engineer and has thirty five years of 
hands-on experience (1968-2005) at the Bhabha Atomic Research 
Centre (BARC), the latter pointed out that the idea is good for 
perfect safety of public under every conceivable threat; but 
expressed, at first serious concern about the economical cum 
logistic problems and engineering viability of underground 
high capacity nuclear power stations, with current nominal 
standard capacity of 1 GWe per reactor unit and few such units 
per station. His reservations were on multiple counts – vertical 
decent for men and materials, lack of natural drainage and 
ventilation; requirement of  large volume of water for cooling 
and  seepage of underground water etc. 
Further discussion led to a novel way of meeting all 
the requirements and providing economical benefits and 
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operational efficiency; which will be presented in the next 
chapter.
At this stage of discussion the authors surfed the web 
to see whether similar ideas had occurred to others. They 
were surprised and relieved to find that installations of 
underground nuclear reactors was not an absurd idea and 
had been practiced in a small scale in  many other countries 
for a long time for a variety of reasons one of which may be 
for greater  secrecy. 
During the course of the web search the first thing 
they came across was the following statements by two 
top nuclear scientists Andrei Sakharov from Russia and 
Edward Teller from USA; made immediately after the 
Chernobyl reactor accident in April 1986.
Andrei Sakharov (Memoris, P. 612)
“Plainly, mankind cannot renounce 
nuclear power, so we must find technical 
means to guarantee its absolute safety 
and exclude the possibility of another 
Chernobyl. The solution I favor would 
be to build reactors underground, 
deep enough so that even a worst case 
accident would not discharge radioactive 
substances into the atmosphere”
Edward Teller (Memoris, P. 565)
My suggestion in regard to [the 
containment of nuclear material 
in case of an accident] is to place 
nuclear reactors 300 to 1000 feet 
underground …” I think the public 
misapprehension of risk can be 
corrected only by such a clear-cut 
measures as underground siting. 
Figure 4. Statements by Two Top Nuclear Scientists
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The first set of three underground reactors was set up 
in Russia in 1958, 1961 and 1964 in Central Siberia. Out of 
them, the first two were for production of Plutonium and 
the third one was to provide electricity and hot water to the 
city of Zheleznogorsk. These were water cooled uranium-
graphite reactors. The turbine and the Yenisey River 
which supplied the water for cooling are also shown in 
the photographs. (Photographs from a brochure published 
by the Mining and Chemical Combine, Zheleznogorsk, 
Krasnoyarsk, Kray.) 
Yenisey River Early construction operations
Figure 5. The first underground reactor was set up in 1958, in 
Central Siberia.
Figure 6. The Underground Reactors set up in Russia in Central 
Siberia.
21
The next set of underground reactors came up in 
Europe and some details regarding these are given in 
Table 2. None of them have leaked any radio activity and 
radiation to cause  any hazard to the  public, even under 
worst accidents .
 Table  2.  Underground Nuclear Reactors besides the 

















































































The underground reactor at Lucerne, Switzerland 
generated 30 Megawatts of heat and 8.5 Megawatts of 
electricity with heavy water as the moderator.  In 1969 the 
loss of coolant resulted in partial core melt down and there 
was heavy radioactive contamination of the cavern which 
was immediately sealed and not opened for a few years. 
There was no effect of any radioactive leak that affected the 
workers or the population in the surrounding areas.  Later, 
the cavern was opened, and decontaminated.
The experiences of the European Laboratories 
in operating, for several years, Nuclear Reactors of 
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various types underground not only confirmed the main 
advantage of effective shielding against radioactive fall 
out in case of an accident,as it did happen in one case and 
the cavern effectively shielded radioactive leaks, but also 
brought to focus  how such installations can provide safety 
against several other features like terror attacks, air craft 
crashes, sabotage, vandalism etc., which are becoming 
more serious now a days.  Such locations also provide 
better protection against natural disasters like Tsunamis, 
Volcanoes, Earthquakes, etc. There have been several large 
scale studies on all aspects relating to the siting of nuclear 
power stations underground particularly by US groups. 
These ideas have been discussed in several International 
Conferences on Nuclear Engineering; several symposia 
have been held  exclusively to discuss the underground 
siting of nuclear reactors.  There is a very detailed paper by 
C.W. Myers and N.Z. Elkins [8]. This paper gives exhaustive 
references to all the earlier work, and highlights the unique 
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR PARK (UNP) concept 
which has emerged out of efforts to collocate nuclear power 
reactors and nuclear waste management facilities close to 
each other in a specially designed underground station. 
Figure 7 shows the very ambitious general plan of UNP 
under an overburden of 200 ft of salt in a salt mine, planned 
to house more than a dozen nuclear rectors in separate 
cavities well shielded from each other and a separate cavity 
for the generation of both electricity and hydrogen and, yet 
another separated chamber for storing the waste nuclear 
fuel and reprocessing it in the under ground station itself. It 
is a futuristic plan with envisaged time frame 2025-2030. In 
their paper Myers and Elkins project a hypothetical growth 
scenario leading to the generation of 1000 GWe  Nuclear 
Energy in the US by 2050 which  they think will be ~25% 
of the global projection of  4000 GWe nuclear power. The 
present rate of production of nuclear energy is an order of 
magnitude lowers.
The concluding paragraphs of the paper by Myers 
and Elkins which are very significant and instructive are 
as follows:
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Figure 7.  Elimination of need for conventional containment 
structure (L) by underground Nuclear Power Station (R)
“If high-growth-rate nuclear energy scenarios in 
the U.S. for the 21st century should materialize, then the 
continuation of the conventional approach of installing 
one or a few new reactors at the earth’s surface at widely 
dispersed locations, and having their HLW repository and 
LLW disposal sites located at a great distance from the 
reactors, will probably mean a continuation of controversies 
regarding capital cost, nuclear waste, physical security, 
and safety. If so, the high-growth-rate scenario could be 
jeopardized, with the result that even less than the current 
level of 20% of U.S. electricity would be nuclear generated 
in the future. 
This unfortunate situation could perhaps be avoided 
in part by an alternate approach that, beginning ~2025-
2030, would involve deployment of underground nuclear 
parks, each consisting of an array of reactors with a 
collective multi-giga-watt capacity. Collocated with the 
reactors would be the nuclear waste management and 
other facilities that support those reactors. Deployment of 
UNPs could significantly reduce environmental impacts 
and facilitate public acceptance of new nuclear power 
plants. This combined with the probable reduced cost and 
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increased margins of safety and physical security for UNPs 
would increase chance that a high growth trajectory for 
nuclear power in the U.S. would be achieved. 
The UNP approach should be examined in detail to 
assess its merits relative to conventional siting”. 
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CHaPter 4. 
Hill Contained Hydel Powered nuClear 
Plant – our ProPosal
The UNP project required the construction of a large 
vertical shaft going to a depth of 100 m and creation of 
various underground laboratories at this depth. All the 
equipment and materials and operating personnel have to 
be taken down by large size elevators with high loading 
capacity. Personnel for operation, servicing, maintenance, 
repairs, renovation and up-gradation have to traverse 
through these deep vertical shafts day after day for long 
periods  similar to what are followed in gold and coal 
mines. A more attractive alternative that is economical, 
engineering-wise feasible and operationally more efficient, 
and with many other novel features has been figured out 
by Prof. B N Karkera, which he calls “Hill Contained Hydel 
Powered Nuclear Plant”, (HCHPNP) which is presented 
below. This layout is distinctly different from the earlier 
underground nuclear reactor layouts in tunnels presented 
in Chapter 2 IN MANY RESPECTS. 
In all the present Nuclear Power Systems the most 
vulnerable and worrisome component is the reactor core 
itself which is loaded with the highly radioactive partially 
depleted uranium in fuel rods. It is the explosion of this 
assembly with molten fuel rods that can result in the 
radioactive contamination of the surrounding air, earth 
and water. Depending on the magnitude and extent of 
leakage, evacuation of people and cattle over an 800 sq.km 
area (of radius 16 km)  or more  becomes essential as did 
happen in the case of the Fukushima accident. This area 
is designated as Emergency Evacuation Zone with regular 
mock evacuation drills for all the occupants of this area as 
a safety measure. 
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To minimize the risk caused by radioactive exposure 
and also to save the locked up land for civilian use, our 
proposal is to locate the reactor in a cavity at the end of a 
100 m long horizontal Zig Zag tunnel of opening say 12m 
height, 12m width, with multiple air locks, specially dug 
out  at the bottom of a hill, so that there is a minimum of 
hundred meters of impervious rock (granite) all round the 
reactor. The hill should have a perennial source of water 
at the top (river or lake). This will avoid making a 100m 
deep vertical shaft from the surface and will also eliminate 
the construction of an exhaust chimney. There will be no 
engineering  and office buildings  at all around the reactor 
and the associated equipments. The other components of 
the power system – the steam generator, and the HP/LP 
turbines and the electricity generator, and the condenser-
will all be located in a second tunnel leading to the reactor 
cavity. These will be located conveniently in the side 
cuttings of the second tunnel at a distance of ~15 meters 
from outside. The advantage of having these at a short 
distance from the mouth of the tunnel is that in case of a 
reactor accident these systems will not get damaged, and 
also will have easy and quick access while providing safety 
from external air attacks, natural disasters, earthquakes, 
etc. Safety of equipments from earthquakes is realized 
by the absence of buildings, substituted by cavities in the 
hill itself. A second tunnel is mandatory to serve as an 
additional escape route for the operating personnel in case 
of an emergency.
In all thermal power generating systems – nuclear, 
oil, natural gas, bio-gas or coal – it is recognized that the 
over all efficiency of electricity generation is of the order 
of 33%, determined by the poor efficiency of steam turbine 
in converting the thermal energy into energy of rotation. 
Because of this net poor efficiency, to generate one Gigawatt 
of electrical power, the heat that is generated in the nuclear 
reactor is three Gigawatts and so there has to be a provision 
in the cooling system to throw out two Gigawatts of heat 
energy. This will require enormous quantity of water – 
millions of gallons of water per hour – to flow though the 
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condensate cooling system of a standard power reactor. 
It is precisely this large requirement of water that forces 
the proximity of the sea or lakes for locating the reactors. 
Alternatively to provide for this large quantity of water one 
has to build dams across perennial rivers to store enough 
water, as at Kaiga, and create artificial lakes.
To meet the large quantity of water required for the 
cooling system of the condenser associated with the reactor, 
our proposal is to build the reactors in tunnels at the bottom 
of the hill which has a huge water reservoir at the top of the 
hill from which through pen stacks water can be brought 
to the reactor at sufficient speed (because of potential 
energy) so that no separate electrically operated pumps 
are required to force the water through the condenser. 
Hydel pumps are also used for the rest of the pumping 
de-mineralized water through the Steam Generator and 
heavy water through the Reactor Core. A small portion of 
the water rushing down from the top  is used to generate 
low capacity hydel electric  power  sufficient for the reactor 
operation, control  systems and all lightings, ventilation 
and other service systems, etc.
 Obviously, all those hilly locations which have water at 
the top, with inadequate quantity and height for large scale 
hydel power generation, qualify eminently for this purpose. 
This opens up many more possible interior locations, away 
from sea. This same source of water can be used for  other 
purposes also. The water at the top of the hill will be cooler 
by a few degrees which will help the condensate cooling 
with better thermal efficiency and hence higher power 
generation. The temperature of the outlet water will be 
higher by 4 to 50 C which will cool off as it is let out. Due to 
the cooler hill-top water, the discharge temperature is also 
less in comparison, facilitating quicker cool off to match 
with ambient temperature.  It is to be emphasized that there 
is no possibility of this water becoming radioactive since it 
flows only through the condenser system and has no direct 
connection with the reactor core or the heavy water circuit 
in the PHWR type reactors. Further, condenser system 
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is located in a separate tunnel, isolated from the reactor 
tunnels. Survey reports of these marginal water bodies 
not suitable for installing hydel stations must be available 
with Hydrological Survey Departments and could be used 
for initial studies of possible locations for Hill Contained 
Nuclear Power Stations. 
Any one who has visited the world’s deepest Kolar 
Gold Fields and seen the underground facilities created 
there up to depths of 10,000 ft below ground for various 
mining operations some of them more than a hundred 
years ago, will realize immediately that making caverns of 
suitable dimensions for housing a nuclear power reactor 
system is no big deal. The same confidence we get if we visit 
any of the neutrino laboratories in the world – the Super-
Kamiokande in  Japan, the Mont Blanc tunnel laboratory in 
the border of Italy and Switzerland or the newly developed 
under ground facility in the Salt Mines Ohio in USA. The 
Large Hadron Collider Accelerator Laboratory (LHC) in 
CERN, Geneva which is inside an underground tunnel of 
35 kms periphery, whose depth ranges from 300 to 500 ft 
depending on the surface hilly terrain is another supreme 
example.
The question is whether there are any insurmountable 
difficulties in constructing the proposed type of Hill 
Contained Nuclear Power Stations in India for technical 
reasons or for economic reasons?    
To answer this question, fortunately we have a report 
entitled “India Based Neutrino Observatory (INO) Project”. 
This project is under the Department of Atomic Energy. 
Several leading research institutions like TIFR, BARC, Saha 
Institute, VEC and many universities are part of it. The 
Detailed Project Report on INO Site vol. 1, prepared by 
the Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation 
Ltd., recently in December 2010, gives complete details 
regarding the civil and engineering works involved in the 
construction of the INO Laboratory at a depth of 1000 meters 
in Bodi West Hills / Pattipuram in Village, Thenai District, 
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not far from Madurai, the cultural capital of Tamil Nadu. 
INO has horizontal access similar to the one specified in our 
proposal HCHPNP  Report. It is far simpler in construction 
than underground stations like KGF, LHC, Neutrino 
Laboratories, etc. listed in the previous paragraph. 
What is of interest and relevance to us in this INO 
report is that for housing the two Neutrino Magnetic 
Calorimeters each weighing 50 kilotons (mostly iron 
plates), the concerned engineers have designed a huge 
cavern laboratory of dimensions 132 meters x 26 m x 25 
m at the end of a tunnel 2 kilometers long inside the hill. 
There are three other caverns of smaller dimensions for 
housing the required instrumentation and services. The 
approach tunnel is 2 kms x 7.5 m x 7.5 m. While the total 
cost of the civil and engineering works is Rs. 141 crores, 
the cost of the approach tunnel with a front portal is ~36 
crores and of the main neutrino detector laboratory cavern 
is 38 crores and engineering services is Rs. 70 crores. In 
their design and costing they have taken care of all the 
services – electrical substation and distribution, water, air 
conditioning, fire alarm and fire fighting, communications, 
passenger lift, crane, side cuttings in the approach tunnel 
for movement and reversal of vehicles by turning around, 
etc. These cost figures tell us that the cost of making an 
underground cavern for installing a high power nuclear 
reactor (say 1 Giga watt electrical) will not be a deterring 
factor and is small compared to the cost of the overall 
project of approximately Rs 10,000 crores for the present 
day reactor units at the surface. On the contrary, our 
preliminary estimates show that the  scheme proposed 
here of locating nuclear power plants in caverns inside 
hills should turn out to be far cheaper than constructing 
multi-storied concrete buildings with access roads, safety 
barriers etc. in the surface reactor installations. A saving 
of approximately  800 sq.km of land area by eliminating 
Emergency Evacuation Zone  is a bonus and a cost saving 
factor. Also a one Gigawatt power generator requires 0.1 
Gigawatts of electrical power as Station-Operation-Power, 
including the major cost of electricity for operating the 
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pumps that draw water from the sea. In our system this 
requirement is not there since the water comes down by 
gravity from the hill top and the potential energy is utilized 
for pumping the water through the cooling system. Thus 
there is a saving of 0.1 Gigawatt of electrical power to the 
National Grid per 1 GWe reactor unit which is again a 
considerable cost saving factor. These hill top reservoirs 
otherwise discounted as of no use for making hydroelectric 
power stations, will now find a nationally relevant use.
The figures 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) illustrate a rough sketch 
of our plan to house 1 to 4 nuclear power reactors in the same 
hill depending on the site as well as water supply. While the 
main tunnel leads us to the reactor cavern, the second tunnel 
also is connected to the main cavern and will have a series of 
caverns as side cuttings  for locating the control electronics, 
the steam turbine, the electrical generator condenser and 
other services water, electricity, ventilation, etc.
In principle a single  tunnel of length about 100 m 
is enough for all purposes. However, it is advisable and 
convenient to have one or  more additional tunnels for 
housing  control gear, steam turbine, electrical generator, 
condenser, etc., and also for the to and fro passage of 
services – water, steam, electricity, etc. The second tunnel 
connects to the reactor cavern. The different caverns in the 
tunnels will be sufficiently shielded from each other such 
that the effect of an explosion in one cavern will seal off 
itself and will not affect the reactor assembly in the other. 
Each reactor chamber has an air-lock safety door and two 
additional air lock doors at the external exit mouth of the 
tunnel. The side cuttings in the services tunnel will house 
the steam generator, steam turbine, steam condenser, and 
the electricity generator, as shown in the sketch. A second 
service tunnel may be made in case there is a possibility of 
putting many more reactors, as shown in Figure 9b. The 
steam generator because of its heavy water involvement 
could also be, alternatively in a cavern closer to the reactors. 
Along with the electrical substation the administration will 







Hill Contained NPP with 100 m
Impervious Rock Cover All Around





Twelve Features of HCNPP Layout
1. H.C. Hill Contained NPP with 100 m Impervious
Rock Cover All Around
2. H.P. Hydel Powered; Hydel Source @ 100m
Height for 100% Station Power
3a.
3b.
H.A. Horizontal Accesses; 3a. RT @ 100m &
3b. ET @ 15m 1:50 Water Drain Slope;
4. PCZ Progressive Crumble Zone; Seal Explosion
5. S.S. Sub Station & Grid @ Foothill
6. T.H. Technical Hall, @ 15m Depth within Hill
Housing Steam Turbine, Condenser and
Electrical Generator
7. R.H. Reactor Hall Cavern with Air Lock @ 100m
Impervious Rock Cover All Around
8. W.S Water Source to Cool the Steam
Condensate ; Adequate for 5°C T.
9, 10, 11 Water Down Comers {WDC}
12. Water Discharge with 5°C T {WD}
12
Figure 9a.  HCHPNP - Front Sectional Elevation
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Figure 9b. HCHPNP - 4 Reactors, a Reactor Tunnel and 2 Separate 
Service Tunnels
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Our proposal is economically viable even with one 
single reactor unit per nuclear site/station, unlike the 
surface located nuclear stations. This is because of the 
minimum infrastructural needs; such as 800 sq.km locked 
up land, long approach roads, and huge buildings with 
earth quake immunity. 
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CHaPter 5: 
disCussion meeting at nias
On 10 March 2012, exactly one year after the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster, a Discussion Meeting was held at the 
National Institute of Advanced Studies on the topic 
“Underground Siting of Nuclear Power Reactors – Pros 
and Cons”. The list of participants with their affiliations is 
given in the Appendix 3.
The discussion was initiated by the authors of this 
book highlighting some of the important issues from the 
various chapters of this book: 
(i) the current status of the electrical power 
generation in the country which leaves no option 
but to enhance the nuclear power production at a 
much faster rate 
(ii) the perception of high risk with the nuclear 
programme by the general public because of the 
recent accidents like the ones at Fukushima and 
Chernobyl and the resulting opposition to NPPs 
(iii) the feasibility and advantages of locating nuclear 
power stations underground 
(iv) the experience of the European Groups in Russia, 
France, and Netherlands in this regard 
(v) the grandiose Nuclear Power Park plans that 
have been drawn up by the United States of 
America in this regard with time scale 2025-2030 
as realizable 
(vi) the problems associated with nuclear waste 
transport and  disposal and how the underground 
locations solve this problem by having additional 
shielded caverns. 
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(vii) the advantages and the feasibility of the new 
proposal   “Hill Contained Hydel Powered 
Nuclear Plants”.  
Following the presentations by the authors of the 
book, one of the participants of the meeting Dr A K Ghosh 
summarized the contents of an internal report entitled 
“Underground Siting of Nuclear Reactors” prepared 
by a team of BARC (Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) 
scientists (Appendix 2). This report brought out some of 
the critical issues and problems that have to be faced in the 
implementation of underground siting of nuclear reactors 
in India. 
The basic questions raised by Dr. Ghosh at the 
Discussion Meeting were:
 
i. The stability of underground structures
ii. Effects of underground water
iii. Accessibility of underground installations
iv. Construction of the vertical approach pits and 
tunnels at the bottom for housing the reactor and 
accessories
v. Coping up with natural and man made accidents 
even in underground installations.
vi. Large quantity of water, millions of gallons per 
hour required for cooling since our reactors in 
India are water cooled.
vii. Problems connected with transmission of high 
power, may be Gigawatts, to the National Grid.
Professor Karkera pointed out in reply that it is 
precisely these very issues that led the authors to the idea 
of: 
i. Approach through a convenient 100 m long 
horizontal   tunnel to the caverns where the 
reactor is located. 
ii. Reactor cavern to be surrounded by about 100 
meters of impervious rock all round, adequate 
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for containing even MCA (maximum credible 
accident).
iii. Reactor cavern to have PCZ (progressive crumble 
zone) to seal of the tunnel by a wide range of 
explosive accidents.
iv. Reactor cavern and tunnels to have a set of 
standard Air Locks to isolate the cavern and 
tunnel volumes from the outside atmosphere. 
v. To have the Nuclear Power Plant tunnel/s within 
a hill having perennial water source  at the top in 
the form of a river or a lake from which water can 
be flown down through pen stacks.
vi. This arrangement will save lot of electrical power 
required for pumping the condensate coolant 
water. 
vii. It also propels the hydro-turbine-pumps to 
circulate primary and secondary coolants (de-
mineralized water) through steam generators 
and coolant heavy water through reactor core.
viii. Large quantity of cold water with potential energy 
from hill top to flow through the condenser, 
cooling the steam condensate. 
ix. The power required for other purposes can be 
generated in small hydel units (or drawn from 
the general electric power supply from the grid).
x. No additional backup emergency power will be 
needed in the form of Diesel Generator that will 
be continuously kept on along with the thousands 
of battery packs in surface installations.  All this 
results in cost saving and protects the environment 
around.
A question was raised whether sufficiently tall 
structures can be made in the caverns to accommodate 
the nuclear reactor with its control rods at the top. Prof. 
Sreekantan replied that based on his experience with the 
underground facilities in KGF and the various neutrino 
observatories in the world there is no problem in having 
caverns as tall as 30 to 40 m or more. In fact the one that 
is proposed in the INO project report itself has the main 
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lab roof as high as 25 m.  Prof. Karkera supplemented 
Prof. Sreekantan that all the civil enclosure such as double 
containment, reactor building, technological building, tall 
exhaust chimney, etc. are replaced by caverns and rock-cut 
surfaces with appropriate linings. These would necessarily 
made  water proof.
Professor Rajaraman enquired whether it is safe to 
have several reactors next to each other in the light of the 
Fukushima tragedy where presence of 4 reactors next to 
each other made matters worse.  
Prof Karkera replied that if one has to have several 
reactors in the same site, it is very necessary that they are 
well shielded from each other as suggested in our proposal. 
The caverns will be designed  such that there is sufficient 
rock in between the caverns for the different reactors Any 
accident in one cavern should not affect the other. In the 
US proposal of the Nuclear Park also this aspect has been 
stressed. Also their plan provides for storage, in the same 
location, of large quantity of used waste fuel which is still 
radioactive, in neighboring shielded caverns.  Our proposal 
is economically viable even with one single reactor unit 
per nuclear site/station, unlike the surface located nuclear 
stations. This is because of the minimum infrastructural 
needs, such as 800 sq.km locked up land, long approach 
roads, huge buildings with earth quake immunity, etc.
 
One of the participants suggested that the Power 
Reactor could be located in a cavern in a hill close to the 
sea so that water may be pumped from the sea itself. 
Prof. Sreekantan said this is a possibility, but it should 
be remembered that in the case of the Tsunami that affected 
the reactor assembly in Japan, the reactor building had been 
built such that waves of water even 10 meters high will not 
affect, but in that particular Tsumani the waves rose to 13 
meters and flooded the reactor buildings, which led to all 
the damage. Prof. Karkera supplemented this by stating 
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that such layouts with water drawn from sea will not have 
the advantage of saving the Station Operation Power, close 
to staggering 10% of the power generated.
Prof. Ahuja raised the following questions:
1. Since hydro-stations which are typically only for 
peaking loads frequently run out of water during 
the lean seasons, will there be enough water for 
continuously operating the nuclear plant?
2. Does the design of underground nuclear stations 
trade off ambient (explosion in the case of an 
accident) by increased occupational exposure?
Prof. Sreekantan replied that of course, one had 
to choose locations where water supply was perennial. 
However, it is to be noted that the quantity of water required 
for generation of hydel power is ten times more than what 
is required for a Nuclear Reactor producing the same 
output of electrical power. Also for hydel station the height 
from which water comes down should be large enough 
and is also important for its economical performance. 
Whereas height of water source of the nuclear condensate 
coolant needs to be marginal, just about 100m so that it can 
force itself through the condenser and operate the pumps 
pumping coolants through the steam generator and reactor 
core, by replacing electrical pumps and resulting in saving 
huge station power.
There is no reason why the occupational exposure is 
any more than what happens in the usual surface reactors. 
In all underground tunnel operations it is mandatory to 
have always an additional escape route, in case of any 






Based upon the information that has been collected 
from different sources and presented in the various chapters 
of this book in a condensed form, and also on the basis of 
the new proposal by the authors for locating future nuclear 
power reactors within the hill, the main conclusions that 
can be drawn are as follows: 
1. India needs a drastic high exponential rate of 
growth of electric power to ensure a reasonable 
quality of life for the large majority of people and to 
step up the pace of growth of industry, agriculture 
and other nationally relevant activities.
2. Among the various options hydel, thermal, 
nuclear, solar and other non-conventional sources, 
today the hydel and thermal are contributing 
the maximum with nuclear being less than 3%. 
The technology and the material resources for 
enhancing the nuclear contribution to 50% by 
2050, if not earlier exist, and this advantage should 
be fully exploited.
3. Unlike oil and coal, nuclear energy is free 
from the blemishes of carbon contamination 
of the atmosphere. However, accidents like 
Chernobyl and Fukushima have brought focus 
on radioactive contaminations and the disastrous 
consequences on the civilian population in the 
event of an accident – man made or natural. This 
has led to a certain hesitation and even negative 
attitude towards nuclear power among various 
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sections of the civil society and even among some 
intellectuals. 
4. All this has led to the necessity of reinventing a 
strategy for the continuation of the nuclear power 
programme, not only for India, but also for other 
countries too.
5. There is no technological way of reducing or 
eliminating the radioactive contamination if 
an accident does take place. As a precautionary 
measure what has been done so for is to locate 
the nuclear reactor core within a single walled or 
a double walled containment concrete structure 
designed such that no radioactivity escapes. 
Provision is made to douse the entire system 
with large quantity of water, specially stored, 
when the core-melt down happens due to over 
heating and when the conditions of maximum 
credibility accidents (MCA) are reached. The real 
problem with this is that a continuous monitoring 
has to be done to ensure that there are no cracks 
in the walls of the containment structures. The 
question also remains how to dispose off, this 
highly radioactive contaminated water inside the 
containment structure after the accident.
6. The authors of this book have proposed an 
alternative method for locating future nuclear 
reactors, which ensures much greater safety from 
radioactive leaks even if an accident takes place. 
The suggestion is that the reactor be located in a 
deep cavern inside a hill with at least 100 meters 
of rock all round. The cavern is accessed through 
a zig-zag tunnel (Figure 9b) at the bottom of the 
hill with several air-lock doors at various stages. 
In case of an accident and core-melt down, the 
enormous heat naturally melts all the rock around, 
upto some length, which collapses and everything 
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gets vitrified including the radioactive materials 
(Figure 9c).
 In an extreme case the cavern can be abandoned 
for ever without any worry of radioactive leaks 
since it is buried with at least 100 m of rocks all 
around.
7. Such a hill contained nuclear station provides 
straight away many other advantages: better 
protection against vandalism, terrorist attacks, 
air crashes, Tsunami, volcanoes, and sabotages 
by agents during a war. (Figure 10) One of the 
greatest benefits to the civilian society is that 
there is no need for reservation of an area of ~800 
sq. kilometer to serve as Emergency Evacuation 
Zone at the foot of the hill and on the top of the 
hill as is the case with reactor stations located on 
the surface. Normal activities like agricultural 
operation, housing, factories, etc. can go on at 
the foot of the hill and the top of the hill. No 
special concrete structure for housing the reactor 
equipments is necessary since all of them will be in 
the caverns inside the hill. All these factors result 
in cost reduction also – both construction cost and 
operational cost (Figure 11).
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Figure 10.  HC HP NP @ Dam Foothill
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In the light of the above, our recommendation is that 
since the Hill Contained Hydel Powered Nuclear Stations 
hold the promise of a much higher safety for the public and 
since the preliminary analysis shows that it is a feasible 
one and also cost effective, a Senior National Committee 
consisting of nuclear experts, geologists, geophysicists, 
hydel specialists, and social scientists should examine this 
proposal in depth in the long range interests of continuing 
publicly acceptable Nuclear Power Programme  in India.
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aPPendix 1
nuClear Power in india
We have in India 20 Nuclear Power Plants having 
capacity of 4780 Megawatts of power. Six more are under 
construction which will provide 4800 Megawatts of power 
when completed. Except the first two reactors at Tarapur 
which are Boiling Water Type (BWR), all the others are 
pressured Heavy Water Cooled Reactors (PHWR). There 
is one Test Fast Breeder Reactor operating at Kalpakkam 
(See Table below):











TAPS-1, Tarapur, Maharashtra BWR 160 October 28, 1969
TAPS-2, Tarapur, Maharashtra BWR 160 October 28, 1969
TAPS-3, Tarapur, Maharashtra PHWR 540 August 18, 2006
TAPS-4, Tarapur, Maharashtra PHWR 540 September 12, 2005
RAPS-1, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 100 December 16,1973
RAPS-2, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 200 April 1,1981
RAPS-3, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 220 June 1, 2000
RAPS-4, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 220 December 23, 2000
RAPS-5, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 220 February 4, 2010
RAPS-6, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan PHWR 220 March 31, 2010
MAPS-1, Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu PHWR 220 January 27,1984
MAPS-2, Kalpakkam, Tamilnadu PHWR 220 March 21,1986
NAPS-1, Narora, Uttar Pradesh PHWR 220 January 1,1991
NAPS-2, Narora, Uttar Pradesh PHWR 220 July 1,1992
KAPS-1, Kakrapar, Gujarat PHWR 220 May 6, 1993
KAPS-1, Kakrapar, Gujarat PHWR 220 September 1,1995
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Kaiga-1, Kaiga, Karnataka PHWR 220 November 16, 2000
Kaiga-2, Kaiga, Karnataka PHWR 220 March 16, 2000
Kaiga-3, Kaiga, Karnataka PHWR 220 May 6, 2007
Kaiga-4, Kaiga, Karnataka PHWR 220 January 20, 2011
Total 4780 (4.78 GWe)
Table 2: Projects Under Construction
Project Capacity (MW)
KKNPP-1&2, Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu 2x1000 LWRs
KAPP-3&4, Kakrapar, Gujarat 2x700 PHWRs
RAPP-7&8, Rawatbhata, Rajasthan 2x700 PHWRs
Total 4800 (4.8 GWe)
PFBR @ Kalpakkam 1x500 FBR
tHe ComPonents of PHwr
The main components of Pressurized Heavy water 
Reactor (PHWR) are shown below. 
PHWR nuclear power plant
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Safety Barriers in Indian PHWR, including double containment, 
raft foundations and earthquake immunity.
1. Reactor vessel calandria with natural uranium fuel 
rods surrounded by one loop of heavy water for 
moderating and also the primary loop of heavy water 
for carrying the heat to the Steam Generator from the 
nuclear fuel.
2. Steam Generator 
3. Demineralized water as secondary loop, carrying the 
heat from the  steam generator to the steam turbine
4. Turbine operated by the hot high pressure steam
5. Condenser to cool and condense the steam 
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6. Liberal supply of water from outside (Sea, or 
Reservoir) 
7. Generation of electricity and connection to the power 
grid.
The fuel assembly consists of few fuel bundles, each 
with many fuel pencils; which in turn are a stacked up 
series of U pellets in a Zircalloy ZrO2-DyO3 tube that is 
surrounded by the coolant heavy water. This assembly 
is immersed in the moderator which is also heavy water 
(Figures). The moderator slows down the neutrons 
released in the fission reaction and sets a chain reaction of 
further fission interactions. The fission of each Uranium 
238 nucleus  results in an energy release of ~200 MeV (~3.2 
x 10-11 joule)  which is million times greater than the energy 
release in any chemical reaction of a combustible process. 
Though it is conversion of mass to energy according to the 
Einstein Equation E = mc2, the converted energy is only 
0.09% of the mass, being the differential mass defect of the 
nuclide fissioned and nuclides of fission fragments. This 
energy appears as kinetic energy of the fission fragments 
(85%) and a small part (~15%) as the kinetic energy of other 
particles. All this is converted to heat which is conveyed 
by the heavy water in a pressurized non-boiling condition 
and is transferred to the ordinary water and converted to 
steam in the Steam Generator. 
Then the steam passes though the turbine and 
generates electricity as shown in Figure 3. The light water 
steam is cooled by the Condenser and re-circulated.  
A large quantity of ordinary water has to pass through 
the Condenser system to cool the steam and the heavy 
water. This quantity of outside water for cooling could be 
as large as passage of a million gallons per hour in the case 
of a power reactor generating a Gigawatt of electricity. As 
pointed earlier the heat generated is three Gigawatts. This 
is the main reason why the Nuclear power reactor has to be 
located by the sea coast or near a large resource of water. 
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Some times a dam has to be constructed specifically for this 
purpose.
‘safety in dePtH’ of nuClear Power Plants
A number of precautions are taken in the engineering 
design of nuclear power plants since they are potentially 
dangerous source of radiation hazards in case of any failure 
or accident. Generally an area of 8 sq. kms is reserved for 
housing the nuclear plant with all its components. This 
area is restricted and entry allowed only for the reactor 
operation and maintenance personnel staff. Around this 
there is the sterilization zone of area 80 sq. kms where 
agricultural operations are not allowed so that consumption 
of contaminated food by radioactive spill over, either by 
animals or humans, is completely prevented. 
Around this is an area of 800 sq.kms which is called 
the Emergency Evacuation Zone which will have to be 
completely evacuated of all humans and animals whenever 
an accident of class Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) 
does take place. To ensure that people in this area are 
ready for evacuation at any time, occasional surprise 
emergency evacuation drills are conducted. No industrial 
or commercial activities are allowed in this emergency 
zone at any time, once the reactor starts operating. The 
fenced boundaries of these three zones are naturally 
manned by security agencies, whose responsibility is also 
for facing situations like vandalism, terrorist attack, war 
like situations and other emergencies arising out of natural 
disasters like volcanoes, Tsunami, floods, earthquake, etc. 
Thermal power stations release large quantities of 
obnoxious gases like SO2, NO2, CO2, fly-ash, etc. Nuclear 
stations are completely free of this kind of emissions. The 
only serious problem is the release of radioactive nuclei 
and radiations in case of an accident. Thus Nuclear Power 
Stations do not contribute to acid rain, Ozone hole, etc., 
which result in the degradation of the quality of air, global 
warming, and long term climate change. 
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It is estimated that if the electricity produced by 
nuclear reactors world wide (327 of them) is replaced by 
coal power plants the additional contributions of CO2  
world wide would be 26000 million tons each year.
The world wide distribution of Nuclear Reactors 
and the net installed capacity of them and the relative 
percentages are given in the Table A1.






% of nuclear 
power
Spain 8 7,450 22.9
Sweden 10 8,958 51.8
China 11 8,438 2.2
Ukraine 15 13,107 51.1
Germany 17 20,470 32.1
India 20 4,780 2.9
Canada 18 12,577 15.0
United Kingdom 19 10,097 19.4
Korea, Republic 20 17,647 37.9
Russian Federation 31 21,743 15.6
Japan 53 45,957 29.3
France 59 63,260 78.1
USA 104 1,00,683 19.9
In India at the present time there are 19 Nuclear power 
stations which are operating. Their locations are given in 
the Figure A1. The photographs of a few power stations in 
India are given in Figures A2.
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Figure A1. Nuclear Power Plants in India
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RAPS 1 to 4 + 2 + 2; PHWR Reactors  
@  Rawatbhata, Rajastan, India
NAPS 1 & 2; 2 X 220 MW  PHWR 
Reactors in Operation @ Narora, UP, India
2 x 220 MW  PHWR Reactors in 
Operation & 2 x 700 MW PHWR future 
projects @ Kakrapara, Gujarath, India 
TAPS 1 & 2 (cont.+2); 2x160 MW 
BWR Reactors in Operation, Tarapur, 
Maharashtra, India
TAPS 3 & 4); 2 x 540 MW PHWR Reactors 
in Operation, Tarapur, Maharashtra, India 
Kaiga 1 to 4; 4 x 220 MW  PHWR 
Reactors in Operation
Figures A2.  A few photographs of Power stations in India.
The power capacities of these are given in the table A2
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Table A2. Nuclear Power Plants in India
As in the Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/
india/nuclearpowerplants.htm
Power station State Type Operator Units Total 
capacity 
(MW)
Kaiga Karnataka PHWR NPCIL 220 x 4 880
Kalpakkam Tamil Nadu PHWR NPCIL 220 x 2 440
Kakrapar Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 220 x 2 440
Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 100 x 1
200 x 1
220 x 4 
1180
Tarapur Maharashtra BWR 
(PHWR)
NPCIL 160 x 2
540 x 2
1400
Narora Uttar Pradesh PHWR NPCIL 220 x 2 440
Total 20 4780
Some of the nuclear power plant projects which are under 
construction can be listed below:
Power station State Type Operator Units Total 
capacity 
(MW)
Kudankulam Tamil Nadu VVER-
1000
NPCIL 1000 x 2 2000
Rawatbhata Rajasthan PHWR NPCIL 700 x 2 1400
Kakrapar Gujarat PHWR NPCIL 700 x 2 1400
Total 6 4800
Some of the nuclear power projects which are planned up 
for the future are as follows:
Power station State Type Operator Units Total 
capacity 
(MW)
Jaitapur Maharashtra EPR NPCIL 1600 x 4 6400
Kudankulam Tamil Nadu VVER NPCIL 1000 x 2 2000
Haryana PWR NPCIL 700 x 4 2800
Madya 
Pradesh
PHWR NTPC 700 x 2 1400
Total 19 12,600
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Multiple Safety Barriers: Safety linked design starts 
right from fuel pallet. The fuel is in oxide form to withstand 
a high temperature at the pallet core, without softening / 
melting. It is encapsulated as fuel pencil with zercaloy clad 
and its end plug for keeping it segregated from erosion into 
high velocity coolant heavy water. Such few fuel pencils 
are held together end plate as fuel bundle, separated by 
bearing pads, avoiding hot spots, resulting in melting and 
unwanted spillage of fuel. Such bundles are housed within 
thick walled coolant pressure tubes, prevented from burst 
opening. These coolant pressure tubes are housed within 
calendria tubes with thermal isolation by 5 mm Helium 
cover. The calendria tubes are submerged within coolant 
boundary within the calendria and surrounding Gamma 
shielding concrete. This system is covered by primary 
containment followed by secondary containment. Thus the 
designed reactor is within 1.6 km radius exclusion zone, 
within 5 km radius sterilization zone, within 16 km radius 
emergency evacuation zone. 
Thus formed power station is safe against seismic 
effects, tsunami water flooding, shock wave, tornado and 
air plane crashes. 
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Multi level primary safety barrier within PHWR Fuel Pencil 
on flexibilities on and containments.
Safety barriers of PHWR Fuel  Buldle.
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Safety barriers within PHWR reactor vessel calendria.
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Multiple safety barriers
Immunity to safety threat built in
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aPPendix 2
underground siting of nuClear reaCtors
(Note prepared by: Dr. A.K. Ghosh, Shri V. Bhasin, Shri P.A. 
Jadhav, Dr. A.K. Nayak and Shri K.K. Vaze and Dr. P.K. 
Vijayan; BARC;)
1.  introduCtion and general baCkground
Globally, as on date, 433 nuclear power reactors are 
operating in 30 countries. They produce 366.5 GW of electric 
power. In addition 65 nuclear power reactors, having the 
capacity to produce 62.5 GW of electric power, are under 
construction. A Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) offers a clean, 
reliable and affordable electric power. Nuclear power 
plants produce about 18% of the global electricity supply. 
The nuclear power reactors are housed inside the 
building called Reactor Building (RB). Till date almost 
all the RBs have been located on the ground surface. The 
founding level of RBs is selected based on geotechnical 
properties at the site. As a result the grade elevation of 
reactors (housed inside the RBs) could vary from ground 
level to slightly below the ground level. 
Generally, the NPPs have an excellent safety record. 
This is owing to extensive safety measures taken during 
site selection, design, fabrication / construction, installation 
and operation. All the credible accident initiating events 
are postulated during the design stage and several layers 
of defensive measures are incorporated to mitigate the 
consequences of these events. In addition, the site selection 
criteria are such that the severity of external events is 
minimized. However, in the past there have been three 
incidences in which the integrity of the reactor core was 
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affected to a significant extent, followed by release of radio-
nucleoids in to the environment. These are the accidents 
at Three Mile Island (1979; in USA), Chernobyl (1986; in 
USSR) and Fukushima (2011;in Japan).
The initiation of accidents could be from internal events 
or external events. These events may adversely affect the 
primary coolant flow or reactor control/shutdown system 
or primary heat sink or other engineered safety systems. 
The internal events are those which originate within the 
reactor systems like malfunction of mechanical, process, 
electrical, or electronics equipment, failure of primary 
boundary, operator error, internal fire etc. The external 
events are those which originate from external sources like 
earthquake, cyclone, tsunami waves, storm surges or heavy 
rain/snow fall; or external electrical grid disturbances, 
nearby external accidents, etc. The external events 
like accidental aircraft crash or neighboring industrial 
accidents, etc. are ruled out by site selection criteria and 
providing adequate exclusion zone around the NPPs. 
Some of the new generation NPPs also take into account, 
to a limited extent, the events related to insider malevolent 
act or external terrorist / disruptive acts like intentional 
aircraft impact, etc. Generally, the power reactors are 
located above ground or they have a small portion with a 
shallow embedment. This note discusses some of the past 
experiences and proposals with respect to underground 
siting of nuclear reactors. It discusses various aspects of 
this proposition.
In the past there had been several propositions to build 
underground power reactors. The prime reason for such 
propositions was based on the feeling that this measure 
would help in significant reduction of radioactive burden 
to open atmosphere, even during severe accidents. In 
addition the adverse impact of some of the external events 
like disruptive acts by terrorists/ adversaries or cyclones 
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can be precluded. As a result, several studies have been 
carried out by experts in different countries. In general, the 
proposals converged to a configuration in which the primary 
nuclear part of NPP (that is, nuclear reactor and primary 
coolant boundary components) is under earth cover while 
the secondary part (that is, turbine-generator, condensers, 
cooling towers etc.) are over-ground and near the water 
reservoir. The construction could be either under the plain 
ground or under the rocky hill. It calls for boring tunnels, 
in sound rocky media having competent rock mass. These 
tunnels in turn would house the primary nuclear systems 
and components. The underground construction under 
the soil media or moderate / weathered rock may not be 
feasible owing to the fact that a large space is required to 
house the power reactor components.  
2. aCtual exPerienCe witH underground nuClear reaCtors
Till date only two underground power reactors, of 
small capacity, have been built. One of them is in France 
and the other in Russia. The French reactor started power 
production in 1967 and was stopped in 1991. Since then 
it has remained in shutdown state. However, a few small 
sized underground research or test reactors have been built 
in Europe and Russia [1,2]. 
The world’s first underground nuclear reactors were 
constructed and operated in central Siberia, Russia.   Russian 
reactors were commissioned in 1958, 1961, and 1964. The 
first two reactors were for Plutonium production. The 1964 
reactor produces electricity and provides hot water and 
heat for the city of Zheleznogorsk, [1]. These reactors were 
water-cooled, Uranium-graphite reactors. 
Four small European reactors have been constructed 
in tunnels bored in rocky media, [2]. These are listed in 
Table 1. 
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* These are besides the three reactors in Russia
The Lucens reactor at Lucens, Vaud, Switzerland, was 
a small pilot test nuclear reactor destroyed by an accident 
in 1969.  The heavy-water moderated, carbon dioxide gas-
cooled, reactor was built in an underground cavern and 
produced 30 megawatts of heat (which was used to generate 
8.5 MW of electricity).  It was intended to operate until the 
end of 1969, but during a startup on January 21, 1969, it 
suffered a loss-of-coolant accident, leading to a partial core 
meltdown and massive radioactive contamination of the 
cavern, which was then sealed. No irradiation of workers 
or the population occurred, though the cavern containing 
the reactor was seriously contaminated. The cavern was 
decontaminated and the reactor dismantled over the 
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next few years, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucens_
reactor].
3.  summary of Past studies
The 1970s studies revealed several probable advantages 
in underground siting [3]. These are listed below:
(a) Higher resistance against the following: 
-  Terrorist attack
-  Aircraft impacts
-  Proliferation
-  Sabotage and vandalism
-  Conventional warfare effects
(b)  Higher Levels of Protection against severe weather 
effects
(c)  Greater containment capability relative to a 
surface-sited plant and hence reduced public 
health impacts from extreme hypothetical 
accidents.
(d) Somewhat reduced seismic motion.
(e) In smaller countries where adequate surface 
land is not available and safe   distances from 
population cannot be maintained, underground 
siting of reactors offers a distinct advantage. 
It is reported that there have been a few positive 
results from studies in the 1970s in the U.S., Canada, Japan 
and Switzerland, [1]. Scope of one of the studies included 
technical feasibility, safety, security, cost, advantages and 
disadvantages, [3]. However, in this study the key issues 
like seismicity, leak-tightness of containment, penetrations 
and traps, design of liners, installation sequence and access 
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sizing were either not included or were studied with gross 
idealizations. 
These studies brought out the perceived advantages 
of underground siting as well as the costs and other 
possible penalties associated with this novel approach to 
siting. However, the plans for large size commercial plants 
do not seem to have progressed to a significant extent. In 
the recent years again there are a few publications on the 
subject, [2,4]. These deal with founding of such plants on 
various rock formations, co-location of various associated 
facilities like chemical processing and waste storage and 
underground nuclear parks hosting several reactors. 
In some recently reported studies the concept of 
Underground Nuclear Park has been introduced [2,4]. 
Features of the Underground Nuclear Park Concept are 
the following:
Array of high-temperature (>900• 0 C reactors suitable 
for electricity and/or hydrogen  production;
Non-water cooled reactor designs; underground, • 
passive air-cooling of spent fuel; use of ramps for entry 
of wheeled vehicles; use of seals and bulkheads to 
isolate individual reactors, sectors of the underground 
nuclear park, and the entire underground nuclear 
park from the surface.
Co-locating several reactors and nuclear facilities • 
appears to be an economically viable option.
Many of these studies have focused on idealized 
concepts and brought out overall advantages and 
limitations of underground construction. The feasibility 
has been examined based on certain assumptions but there 
is no critical examination on validity of these assumptions. 
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In fact none of the studies (available in open domain) 
explores the feasibility from the point of actual engineering, 
satisfying all the safety and regulatory requirements. 
There has been no commentary on how to overcome the 
technical challenges related to construction, installation/ 
erection, in-service inspection, repair/replacement of aged 
components / equipment, etc.  
Several geotechnical experts point out that underground 
construction generally carries a perceived greater level of 
risk (uncertainty) than its elevated, at-grade or cut-and-
cover counterpart. In the case of underground construction, 
ground doesn’t just serve as a part of the foundation and/
or sidewall structures but it is the structure. In assembling 
a project team for an underground program it is important 
to combine structural engineering skills with the expertise 
required to reliably identify and mitigate the particular 
challenges of underground construction. 
Constructing an underground facility will involve 
the usual complexities of any underground construction, 
for example, mines, etc., and will have to contend with 
the challenges in material transport and handling any 
ground collapse (especially during the seismic activities) 
and occasional problems during ground water spouting. 
The advantages are assured shielding and confinement of 
activity in case of any release/spillage etc.
The challenges listed above can only be addressed if 
there is an appropriately qualified and experienced team 
on site to manage the work. 
Many issues associated with the underground 
concept require further study. An example is the power 
transmission cost associated with moving multi-gigaWatt 
levels of electricity to distant users. Another is safety 
risks [5] (e.g., fire, rockfall, and ventilation) common to 
69
all underground construction and operations, and their 
impact in the context of underground nuclear operations. 
Host-rock-specific issues need to be examined; an example 
is to determine measures needed to control introduction 
of water and movement of airborne salt particle in a salt 
UNP. A safety analysis is needed to evaluate underground 
reactor and waste management facility accident scenarios. 
Water requirements could be a significant issue in regions 
with limited surface and ground water resources, given the 
number of reactors in an underground nuclear plant. First-
of-a-kind economic and technical risks are associated with 
the start-up. None of these issues are viewed as sufficient to 
preclude further study of the underground concept, but all 
are important and require analysis and resolution [2]. Lack 
of engineering for constructability when tunneling in weak 
or brittle rock at depth often leads to unnecessary delays 
and extra costs. Furthermore, brittle failing rock at depth 
poses unique problems as stress-driven failure processes 
often dominate the tunnel behaviour. Such failure processes 
can lead to shallow unravelling or to strainbursting modes 
of instability that cause difficult conditions. It also follows 
that fractured rock loses its self-supporting capability 
(reduced stand-up time) and thus is more difficult to 
control during construction.  Consequently, the features of 
underground power plant siting are not well understood. 
Gross physical features such as depth of burial, number 
and size of excavated galleries, equipment layout, and 
access or exit shaft tunnels must be specified. Structural 
design features of the gallery liners, containment structure, 
foundations, and gallery interconnections must also be 
identified. Identification of the nuclear, electrical, and 
support equipment appropriate to underground operation 
is needed. Operational features must be defined for normal 
operations, refueling, and construction. Several magazine 
articles have been published addressing underground 
concepts. But adequate engineering data is not available to 
support an evaluation of the underground concept [3].
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These uncertainties resulted in reduced interest by 
nuclear industry.
4.  overall safety assessment of underground nuClear 
Power reaCtors
As of now one of the possibilities is underground 
construction of small and compact reactors [4], which 
are passively cooled and require minimum operator 
interference. Such reactors require lesser space owing 
to small size and reduced number of components/
equipment. These can be located in pits or rock tunnels 
lined by impermeable clays of adequate thickness. The 
impermeable clays like bentonite retards the leaching out 
of radio-nucleoids should they be released following a 
severe accident. 
Currently the Reactor Buildings (RBs), housing the 
primary nuclear side, of NPPs are of 40 to 60 m in diameter 
and 50 to 60 m high.  In underground constructions creating 
a pit of this diameter and height is not feasible, at most of 
the rocky sites. It may be feasible only in extremely good 
quality rock formation. Apart from strong and hard rock, 
one of the important requirements is that joint spacing in 
overall rock mass should be very sparse. All over the world 
only few such sites are available. 
The second option is to bore an array of tunnels to 
house the reactor systems, components and structures. 
Considering Indian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors, the 
required size of tunnels would still be of the order of 25 m 
width and 25 m height. This is to accommodate the nuclear 
cavity which in turn house reactor core components. The 
control rod drives would require clear height of no less than 
10 to 15 m above the core.  In addition the existing layout 
has to be linearized to accommodate the primary pumps, 
moderator flow systems, fuel handling machine and fuel 
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handling system, purification systems, shutdown systems, 
emergency core cooling systems, and a host of other 
engineered safety systems.  All these systems comprise of 
pump-motor sets, heat exchangers, accumulators/pressure 
vessels, compressors and circuitous piping network. It may 
not be possible to linearize the layout of all these systems, 
hence it would call for creating additional neighboring 
tunnels, to accommodate some of these systems with 
piping running (through rock ducts) from one tunnel to 
other. Housing steam generators itself would call for a 
separate array of tunnels or vertical shafts. Some of the 
issues foreseen are as follows:
(a) Boring tunnels of size 25 m require good quality 
and stable rock mass systems. In India such 
systems are present mostly in the Deccan or 
Western Ghats region. Such construction is not 
feasible in Northern, Ganges, or Trans-Himalayan 
Plains. The rock formations in Aravalis,  Shivalik, 
Central India, or Eastern Ghats may not permit 
rock caverns/ tunnels of such large sizes. The 
Himalayan region is ruled out owing to high 
seismic activities and Indian regulations prohibit 
construction in such regions. This in turn implies 
that it may not be technically feasible to construct 
NPPs in all the regions of India.   
(b) By virtue of being installed inside the rock tunnels, 
the protection against some of the external events 
is undisputedly enhanced. These are aircraft crash, 
cyclone, harsh weather effects and disruptive 
acts of terrorists / adversaries. This is one of the 
unanimous conclusions, from studies conducted 
by other countries.
(c) As far as earthquake effects are concerned there 
may not be any major gain in terms of reduction in 
seismic loading or its probability of occurrence. 
(d) The contribution of internal events to accident 
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initiation will definitely not reduce. On the contrary 
there may be some increase. Some of the reasons 
for increased contribution are uncertainties in the 
stability of the rock, excessive welds in piping 
systems owing to its increase in length etc.
(e) Several systems of nuclear reactors are enclosed 
in the concrete vaults. This feature enhances 
the accessibility during inspections, repair/
replacement or maintenance work. Although such 
cavities / vaults can be built inside the tunnels, 
their presence would infringe the installation or 
replacement of heavy equipments/components, 
in a linearized layout. This will lead to higher 
downtime of the reactor.
(f) The In Service Inspection (ISI), which is mandatory 
to ensure safety, would be difficult or practically 
infeasible for pressurized piping running through 
rock ducts. 
(g) Economies of scale are possible through co-
locating numerous reactors.
(h) One of the biggest challenges in construction 
inside the tunnels is overcoming uncertainties in 
structural and stability behaviors of large diameter 
tunnels[5,6].  One of the issues is the changes in 
redistribution of rock load with time, which may 
be significant for large sized openings. In order 
to overcome this challenge the tunnel support 
would call for excessive strengthening possibly 
with reinforced concrete encastered steel girders. 
Till date very few tunnels of such sizes have been 
bored and hence the operational experience is not 
readily available. It may be noted that several of 
the roadways, railways, or hydroelectric plant 
tunnels are operating since several decades but 
their diameter is considerably less. Moreover, the 
stability of such tunnels is periodically monitored 
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and frequent corrective measures are taken. 
However, this strategy in NPP tunnels would 
call for frequent down time of the reactor since 
the tunnels in general would be accessible only 
during shutdown. 
(i) The efficiency of the plant is also affected owing 
to a large piping system and hence increased 
pumping power particularly from underground 
primary system to over-ground secondary 
system. 
(j) The water flooding would be an added hazard in 
case of underground tunnels. However, in case of 
tunnels under the hill, this may not be an issue.
(k) In case of some of the beyond design basis severe 
accidents there are chances of large scale damage 
of nuclear core and primary boundary, leading to 
release of radio-nuclides. This has been observed 
in accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima power 
reactors. In such cases housing reactors in tunnels 
obviously minimizes the immediate release to 
the environment due to enhanced confinement. 
However, it may be noted that this gives only 
relief against short-lived radio-nuclides. As far as 
long lived radio-nuclides (some of them having 
half life greater than 100 years) this relief is of 
transient nature since the spread by diffusion 
and ground water transport cannot be ruled out. 
Locating sites in totally arid zones is not feasible 
since reactor cooling requires abundant water 
supply. In this regard it may be noted large scale 
international efforts are on for deep underground 
repository of nuclear waste; however, some of the 
key issues related to environment safety (ground 
water contamination) are yet to be fully resolved. 
The efficacy of enhanced confinement, in underground 
constructions, has been critically examined by several 
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experts. In this regard the conclusion of a publication by 
International Atomic Energy Agency [7] is worth quoting: 
“Although siting reactors underground seems to 
offer additional environmental protection from accidents 
leading to large radioactive releases, it does not normally 
have significant safety advantages. Clearly, putting a 
reactor plant into a cavern or otherwise entrenching it into 
the ground does nothing to avoid an accident. The most it 
could achieve would be to provide a more complex path 
for radioactive releases resulting from an accident, which 
could, under some but not all circumstances, lessen the 
consequences of the accident. In fact, building a reactor 
underground could well make a power plant less safe. 
This is because construction, operation, and maintenance 
would be made more difficult by the extra complications of 
design and especially, access to an underground plant.
Moreover, seepage of groundwater could cause 
additional complications. Unless it is in caverns in solid 
rock, underground siting raises complicated environmental 
problems about the protection of groundwater. It would be 
necessary to dig a pit at least 60 metres in diameter and in 
depth to put the reactor building in.  In most places, this 
would necessitate very carefully engineered isolation of 
groundwater, since it would probably be used for local 
drinking water. Even so, if underground siting would 
achieve an appreciable gain in safety, the additional 
engineering and operating difficulties and cost certainly 
could be met. However, underground siting can only be 
expected to provide additional safety if the surrounding 
rock or soil can be made to act as an additional containment 
to reduce radioactive releases in the unlikely case of grave 
reactor accidents. The efficiency of a containment, however, 
depends mainly on the tightness and reliability of many 
points at which it has to be pierced for pipes, venting, 
electrical cables, and access of power plant workers, to 
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enable the reactor to be connected with other systems 
and buildings of the nuclear power plant outside the 
containment. The tightness of the containment structure 
itself is much less of a problem. Since a reactor needs the 
same connections whether it is above or below the ground, 
the reliability of its overall containment system cannot be 
markedly improved by underground siting. Apart from 
some extra protection against extreme outside influences, 
such as aeroplane crashes, missile attacks, or warfare, 
underground siting of nuclear power plants does not offer 
any additional safety worth the extra complications and 
cost. 
5.  Regulatory Issue
USNRC does not have regulatory framework for 
underground reactors. The position with respect to other 
regulatory bodies is not known.
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HILL CONTAINMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
In this booklet, the authors have pointed out that to 
overcome the abysmally low level of electrical power 
availability in India, which is affecting the quality of life, 
there is no option but to enhance Nuclear Power 
Production at an exponential rate.
However, they have proposed as a long term 
measure, future nuclear power stations should be located 
in specially made deep  caverns within hills with atleast a 
100 meters rock cover on all sides, which can be 
approached through long zig zag horizontal tunnels. 
Such locations of the Nuclear power plants will ensure 
absolute safety for the public from radioactivity in case of 
any accidental explosion of the reactor.
Such Hill Containment Nuclear Power Stations 
circumvent the necessity of locking up hundreds of 
square kilometers of precious land for emergency 
evacuation as in surface installations. No civil buildings 
are needed around the reactor and plant equipments. 
They also provide better protection against terrorist 
attacks, vandalism and air crashes. 
